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I.

PERSPECTIVES ON AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

In a work more remarkable for its footnotes than for its
text, Mr. Anisman conducts a provocative, albeit somewhat cumbersome, investigation of takeover regulation. Having set out not
only to describe the law as it exists, but also to propose numerous
revisions of Canadian statutes,' he makes a convincing case,
whether intentionally or not, for the thesis that current governmental and self-regulatory rules lack a sound and organized policy base. Though Anisman's focus is on Canadian law, both provincial and federal (that is, Dominion), his frequent references to
state and federal regulation in the United States compel a similar
conclusion with respect to our systems.
Takeover bids-especially the protracted, contested, exchange-offer variety-provide a superb factual medium for viewing many of the major policy issues that pervade securities regulation. Indeed, it might be possible to teach a respectable basic
course in securities regulation from the Bangor Punta line of
cases, 2 properly dissected.
On the other hand, tender offers, particularly the hostile
cash type, do raise sui generis policy questions. Notwithstanding
existing regulatory answers, these problems are, in the minds of
some implacable inquisitors, at least, awaiting further theoretical
t Professor of Law, Franklin T. Backus School of Law, Case Western Reserve University. A.B. 1958, Xavier University; LL.B. 1961, University of Cincinnati; LL.M. 1966,
Harvard University. Member, Ohio Bar.
I P. ANISMAN, TAKEOVER BID LEGISLATION IN CANADA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS i-ii
(1974) [hereinafter cited as ANISMAN].
2 For a brief history of the Bangor Punta litigation, see Note, PrereorganizationNegotiations and Securities Act Section 5(c): A Proposed Solution to the Gunjumping Problem, 24 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 731, 733 n.13 (1973). For the most recent episodes, see Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 384 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975). The controversy centers on the battle between
Bangor Punta Corporation and Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., to take over Piper Aircraft
Corporation.
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analysis and resolution. Matters worthy of additional basic evaluation include constraints on private bargaining and the exercise
of corporate power-what Anisman calls "substantive requirements," as contrasted with "disclosure requirements." 3 Also
worthy of inquiry is compulsory disclosure of (1) the offeror's
plans and intentions for the offeree business, (2) facts about the
offeree business which are not derived from "inside" sources and
which may have been gathered through the superior skill,
foresight, and industry of the offeror, and (3) the offeror's
analysis of all facts available to it about the offeree enterprise.4
Anisman's survey extends beyond the United States and
Canada to England, Australia, and New Zealand. His running
comparison of diverse solutions to crucial policy conflicts supports the suspicion that we have been haphazardly groping for
answers rather than developing them from a well constructed
theoretical framework. This suspicion persists despite the wealth
of literature on tender offers, all of which Anisman catalogues
carefully and draws upon heavily. 5 His book is orderly and
thorough by traditional standards for legal treatises (so long as
the reader diligently extracts the nectar of the footnotes). It does
little, however, to slake the thirst for a deeper and more intellectually satisfying accommodation of the contentions typified in
this country by the Cohen-Manne debate of the late 1960's.6
Actually, legislators and agencies continue to rethink regulation of tender offers. The United States Securities and Exchange
Commission is looking at takeover bids 7 and issuer repurchases,
the latter in light of the "going private" syndrome. Anisman's
book antedates these United States reassessments and does not
generally mention "going private" machinations, though he covers issuer repurchases from other perspectives. 9 He does describe the proposed and actual revisions of Canadian regulation
through December 28, 1973.10 But these official reappraisals
3ANISMANT, supra note 1, at 61, 147.
4See text accompanying notes 17-22 infra.
5A handy table of materials most often cited is included.
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xiii-xxviii.
. See, e.g., Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus.
149 (1966); Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares-A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967
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The Commission has held hearings pursuant to an investigatory order entered in
the fall of 1974. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11616 (Aug. 25, 1975); id.
No. 11003 (Sept. 9, 1974); Lewis, An Inside Look at the Williams Act, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 16,
1974, at 1, col. 3.
'See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11231 (Feb. 6, 1975).
'0See ANISMAN, supra note 1, at 24-26 n.24, 294-96.
' Id.iv-viii, 353-56.
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appear not to be de novo theoretical challenges. Instead, they
tend to favor extension of earlier regulatory trends, providing
for more disclosure and more outright controls over the
mechanics and tactics of tender offers.
Anisman's similar bias is evident in his introductory statements of policy1 1 as well as in his weaving of reasoning between
the lines of regulatory detail. This is not to say that Anisman's
presentation lacks scholarly objectivity. One small but telling indication of his balance is the way he shuns emotive descriptors
like "target company," the jargon prevalent in this country to
designate the hapless issuer whose shares are sought by the odious takeover bidder. (Oh, how the offeror's spears and arrows
tear the flesh of the poor target!)
Anisman does a good job of trotting out the traditional justifications for tender offer regulation, 1 2 principally:
(1) Pressure. Though the tender offer is a secondary market transaction in the offeree issuer's securities, unusual stimulants are at work on the offerees.
("Here's a chance for a premium over market; act now
while the offer lasts.") Dealer-managers and tender fees
drive the barometer still higher.
(2) The Securities Limbo. Deposited securities are irrevocably consigned to inaccessibility while the offer
remains open and conditions on the offeror's obligation
to take up remain unmet.
(3) Offeree Disadvantage. The offeror may have
superior capacities to gather and evaluate data about
the offeree issuer, even without access to "inside" information. Offeree management certainly has the informational advantage over most offerees. Moreover,
offeree management's concern for offerees may be diluted when its power is jeopardized or when the offeror
dangles emoluments.
Anisman accepts these as cardinal points. He favors the
supply of maximum information to offerees (from both offeror
and offeree issuer) and ample time for offerees to digest it.
Anisman cautions that so-called substantive regulation 1 3 should
11Id. 9-19, 61, 147, 347-49.
' 2 1d.
13Such regulation includes minimum and maximum periods for offers, offeree
withdrawal periods, offeror take-up waiting periods, pro rata take-up, and limitations on
variations, conditions, short tendering, purchases outside the offer, warehousing, and
defense tactics.
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not unduly inhibit offers, 1 4 but he approves an array of such
controls and proffers a few of his own.
The reasoning, however, seems a bit too truncated; the invocations of "fairness" a mite too easy. Perhaps the treatise
writer may be excused some abbreviation of fundamental policy
analysis. But how are we to assay the wisdom of our rules except
by a comprehensive, refined, and, above all, rigorous consideration of competing private and social economic objectives?
II.

THE OFFEREE'S CONSUMPTION-INVESTMENT CHOICES AND
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION
AND FIDUCIARY IDEOLOGY

As an analytical prelude, a text on tender offers might
profitably situate the regulatory issues in their economic context
so that legal rules may be evaluated in terms of their economic
impact.
First, the economic choices available to offerees should be
fully delineated. A primary function of full disclosure, after all,
is to promote productive decisionmaking by investors in purchasing or selling securities. Therefore, it is important to identify
fully the alternatives open to the offeree under varying conditions. In a cash offer at a premium over market, the offeree is
presented with a new return-over-time schedule for his security.
After considering other possible courses of action (maintaining a
commitment to his security or sitting still long enough to receive
future offers), he may wish to switch to cash (accept the offer)
for consumption or new investment. Under certain conditions,
the offeree may wish to defeat the offeror, if possible. He may
prefer to remain invested in the securities of the offeree issuer
without a change of control, or he may feel that any plans proposed by the offeror can best be executed by current management of the offeree issuer without intrusion by the offeror. If
there is no chance of defeating the offeror, or if defeat is not
desired, the offeree will want to compare the immediate cash
premium offer with the investment merits of the offeree issuer's
securities under the nouveau regime.
This process of defining the branches of the offeree's decision tree15 facilitates an orderly identification of the kinds of
information that are of importance to the offeree. Such information may include the probabilities of events such as offer success,
14 ANISMAN, supra note 1, at 347.
" The process would be even more complex in the context of an exchange offer.
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variations in offer terms, and competing offers, and the riskreturn characteristics of securities under varying circumstances.
Second, the "economics of information" also deserves careful attention. To say that offerees want certain information to
maximize their private wealth or even to make more socially
productive investment choices is not to establish the need for
government intervention to assure availability of the information. Other questions regarding net social cost and product must
be asked, among them: What non-governmental mechanisms already generate and propagate the desired information? Do individual offerees underinvest in the procurement of information
for themselves? Will the increased productivity of offeree investment choices offset the costs of information acquisition and
dissemination? Will compulsory disclosure of information inhibit
desirable economic production of another sort? Will the content
of the information be certain or probable, present or future,
original with the possessor or derived by him from another
source?
Consider the application of these economic perspectives to
the question whether an offeror, in making a contested cash
offer, should be required to reveal his "plans and intentions" for
the offeree issuer and his "analysis" of the offeree issuer's condition. Obviously offerees would benefit from receipt of such information; but should they have it? By answering "yes," might
we not be stifling the origination of blueprints for the more
efficient use of resources? The offer might well be hindered by
offerees who, having been apprised of the offeror's designs,
reach the decision-tree posture of refusing to tender. They
might wish to defeat the offeror in the hope either that he can
be forced, on the basis of his own disclosures, to make a higher
bid or that his plans can be effectuated by those presently in
control of the issuer. Alternatively, while wishing the offeror all
good fortune, they might prefer to remain with the offeree issuer under new management.
Our common geographic boundary, according to Anisman's
account of Canadian law, marks substantial divergences in policy
choices concerning this issue of disclosure as well as numerous
other problems. He protests the failure of Canadian statutes to
go as far as the Williams Act 16 and our state laws in eliciting the
offeror's plans and intentions.1 7 Here we find one of his dispersed references to the offeree's decision tree. He justifies his
,615 U.S.C. §§

781 78

-

p (1970).
1, at 171-79.

7 ANISMAN, supra note
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proposal for compulsory disclosure of plans and intentions
primarily in terms of its usefulness to those offerees who might
18
wish to sell their securities, assuming the offer is successful.
But the statement carries no self-evident rationale.
The issue is still one of weighing more productive offeree
investment choices against frustration of the offeror's new and
more productive ideas about the utilization of resources.' 9 We
must realize, for instance, that forced disclosure of offerorcreated analysis tends to neutralize the incentive to formulate
creative strategies and judgments. To the extent of disclosure,
the offeror no longer would have the benefit derived from his
individual perception that the value of the assets may be different from their value as perceived by others. And the offeror's
"intentions and plans" and "analysis" are different from facts
about the offeree which exist irrespective of the offeror's state of
mind. Therefore the balancing will produce different results,
depending on the type of information. One could accept the
proposition that there should be no compulsory disclosure of the
plans, intentions, and analysis, and simultaneously reject the argument that forced publication of other types of facts is economically counterproductive.
One could find unpersuasive the undifferentiated argument
that disclosure of any kind of facts would reduce the incentive to
ferret them out by depriving the ferret of the opportunity to
exploit his informational advantage. At the same time, one could
agree that plans, intentions, and analysis should remain undisclosed in order to motivate the formulation of creative strategies
and judgments.
Nonetheless, Anisman may ultimately be right, for unstated
reasons, in suggesting that offerors, even in a contested cash
offer, should disclose their plans and intentions. On its face, the
hostile cash offer appears to be an arm's length transaction. Indeed, this perception may explain why the American rules of
trading disclosure, under corporate common law and rule 10b-5,
seemed inapplicable to the offeror. 20 (If the parties were in a
standard bargaining posture, where was the duty to disclose?)
Still, assuming the offer is made to acquire control, a disclosure
requirement might be placed on a familiar fiduciary footing
-that when one seeks to occupy a position of special trust and
' 8 1d. 172.
19See id. 176-79.

20 See, e.g., Fleischer & Mundheim, CorporateAcquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L.
REv. 317, 328-32 (1967). Anisman misses this aspect of our experience with the tender
offer, largely, it appears, because the experience has no parallel in Canada.
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confidence, his duty of candor regarding the terms and conditions of his trusteeship is the same as if the relationship already
existed. This concept of "anticipatory duty" was enunciated by
Judge Learned Hand 2 1 and approved by the SEC in the analogous context of sales by insiders or tippees to persons who are
not already security holders of the issuer.2 2 Objections to this
line of reasoning do exist, however. The offeror disavows any
intention to create with offerees a special relationship of dependence; on the contrary, his very purpose is to displace the
offeree-to cause the offeree to sever his ties with the business.
This riposte is cogent in the case of a totally successful offer for
all the shares of an issuer. It is less convincing as applied to a pro
rata offering or an offering for all shares that is not likely to
meet its goal. The offeror must, in such circumstances, foresee
that he may become discretionary manager of the assets of some
who will remain security holders after the offer.
Thus, another common theme of tender offer jurisprudence is the degree to which fiduciary concepts interact with
economic theory to expand or contract disclosure obligations. To
foster productive creativity, we may allow a purchaser in an
arm's length transaction to exploit his own plans, intentions, and
analysis with respect to property which he seeks to purchase.
But, if the purchaser has undertaken to act in the best interests
of the seller, then the purchaser's own inventiveness properly
belongs to the seller and must be divulged.
As already implied, it is useful to distinguish various kinds
of non-public factual material. One line that has been drawn 23
is
between offeror-generated and non-offeror-generated facts.
But other useful distinctions may be made between "inside" and
"outside" information and between "extrinsic" and "intrinsic"
facts.
The "generation" label refers to the point of conception
-the person who originally came to know the information. The
inside-outside distinction rests on whether the information came
from the offeree issuer's internal store of non-public information. The intrinsic-extrinsic dichotomy relates to the subject matter. Intrinsic information relates to the risk-return features of
the offeree issuer; extrinsic, the supply-demand conditions in
the market for the offeree issuer's securities. 24
21 Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951).

22Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 914 n.23 (1961).
23 Cf. text accompanying note 19 supra.
24 This matrix is different from those offered previously. See, e.g., Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121
U. PA. L. REV. 798, 799, 809 (1973).
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The simple fact that a potential offeror intends to make an
offer would, for instance, be offeror-generated, outside, and
extrinsic. This fact is different from the offeror's plans and
intentions for the offeree issuer and his analysis of that issuer's
condition, both of which are offeror-generated and outside, but
intrinsic. It is also useful to classify persons as "insiders" or "outsiders," the former being those who have a special responsibility
to act in the best interests of the security holders of an issuer and
the latter being a residual class of all others.
Before the formal bid is made, the offeror's unpublicized
intent to make it could be a significant piece of information for
market traders. Anisman agrees with the Canadian rule that an
offeror who is truly an outsider-that is, one who does not already occupy a fiduciary position within the offeree issuer
-need not disclose his intent to make the bid when he makes
pre-bid trades in the market.2 5 He suggests, however, that contrary to existing Canadian precepts, outsiders other than the
offeror should be obliged to disclose their knowledge of an impending bid, if they have acquired such non-public
information
26
from the offeror and are not acting in his behalf.

Not having emphasized the intertwined economic and
fiduciary significance of disclosure requirements, Mr. Anisman
predictably marshals a more traditional "pressure" argument in
support of the Canadian approach. He points out that the
offeror has not yet begun to exert purchasing pressure and
therefore has no duty to disclose. 27 To be sure the offeror
has not applied the full pressure that results from stating a
premium price and a deadline for acceptance. Nonetheless,
the troublesome possibility exists that the offeror may be exerting more 2subtle
pressure on sellers through ordinary market
8
mechanisms.
By drawing upon economic and fiduciary concepts, Anisman could have further developed his analysis of the offeror's
duty to disclose his intent to make a formal bid. Specifically,
economically useful ingenuity might be frustrated by forcing the
outsider offeror prematurely to announce a piece of outside,
extrinsic information originating with him. Of course, the right
to exploit one's own creativity may be voluntarily limited by assumption of a fiduciary posture; the nagging problem involved
in pre-bid offeror transactions is to determine the point at which
25 ANISMAN, supra note 1, at 115-24, 160-61.
26

Id. 139-41, 160.

27

Id. 115.
21 See text accompanying notes 79-80.
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the offeror
has begun to seek a control position in the offeree
29
issuer.
Anisman specifies "unfairness" as the basis for his criticism
of Canadian permissiveness toward outsider non-offerors, who are
allowed to engage in personal pre-bid trades of the offeree
issuer's securities without disclosing their knowledge of the
offeror's state of mindY0 Again, a useful economic observation
would support his view: Permitting nondisclosure cannot be justified in terms of nurturing innovation for the very simple
reason that the non-offeror is not the innovator.
In Canada, the absence of restrictions on the offeror and
other outsider traders results from the lack of a well developed
common law of trading disclosure at the federal or provincial
levels. Even trading by insiders and trading on inside information originating from within the issuer are handled only imperfectly by Canadian case law, as Anisman explains in a 30-page
passage, about two thirds of which is solid textual footnotes. 3 1
Disclosure duties of insiders who trade in the securities of their
issuer are covered by statutes, which presumably require an insider to disclose even extrinsic information originating outside
the offeree issuer. 32 Beyond that, however, Canadian decisionmakers appear not to have wrestled with various combinations of
informational classifications and trader status, as our courts have
done under federal securities antifraud notions. Unfortunately,
the book went to press before the SEC v. Campbell,33 SEC v. Sorg
Printing Co.,34 and Magnavox 35 episodes in this country, all of
29 At issue here is nothing less than the bedrock notion of when, in policy terms, a
tender offer begins: When does the offeror's behavior leave the realm of ordinary trading and exhibit characteristics which call for regulatory intervention to assure disclosure?
See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11003 (Sept. 9, 1974) (Topic B-2). Current
concern over "creeping" tender offers-not treated extensively by Anisman-reflects a
feeling that the conditions for imposition of special disclosure requirements arise before
the making of the formal offer, especially where it follows closely on the heels of market
or negotiated purchases by the offeror. On the other hand, certain regulation governing
the mechanics of offers may not be necessary until the formal bid. See part IV.C. infra.
30
31 ANISMAN, supra note 1, at 139-40.
1d. 115-45.
32
1d. 116-27, 144.
33 SEC v. Campbell, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH SEC. L. REP.
93,580 (C.D.
Cal. July 24, 1972) (SEC complaint). The case went to trial, New York Times, Sept. 17,
1974, at 54, col. 1, but was settled by consent decree forbidding the behavior of which the
SEC complained. See id., Sept. 19, 1974, at 63, col. 3.
34 SEC v. Sorg Printing Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,767 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1974) (SEC complaint), decided, id. 95,034 (S.D.N.Y. March
28, 1975).
35 Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1974, at 8, col. 3 (SEC complaint against three executives of
North American Philips Corporation, the offeror).
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which confront the problem of outsider use of at least partially
extrinsic, outside information that was not generated by the offeree issuer. Sorg and Magnavox involved non-offeror outsiders
who allegedly made pre-bid purchases without disclosing their
knowledge of the impending offer. In Campbell, the writer of an
advisory newspaper column purchased securities without disclosing that he was about to issue favorable analyses of the issuers.
The defendant was an outsider with respect to the issuer and
failed to disclose information that (1) originated outside the issuer, (2) had not been obtained from the issuer's internal store
of information, and (3) was at least partially extrinsic to the
issuer as it related to the increased demand that was likely to
result from the defendant's favorable article.
Anisman appreciates and adequately portrays the controversial versatility of our federal antifraud rules. In fact, in closing
he laments Canada's lack of truly general antifraud prohibitions
and the absence of a flourishing doctrine of implied private
rights in the Canadian courts. He calls for a flexible statutory
provision that would give the courts and agencies, upon the
complaint of private parties, a mandate to find liability and fashion remedies for a broad range of unwanted behavior in connection with tender offers. 36 Anisman, however, does not fully investigate the manner in which SEC rule lOb-53 7 and Securities
Exchange Act section 14(e) 38 have been employed judicially to

extract information beyond that elicited by the itemized requirements contained in the disclosure schedules 39 adopted
under specific tender offer disclosure statutes. This burgeoning
line of authority, somewhat humorously referred to as "schedule
14(e), ' 40 should surely be subjected to scrutiny in light of the
economic considerations developed above.
The function of disclosure is not solely to facilitate the valuation and choice of investments in terms of their risk-return
components and the supply-demand characteristics of the marketplace. Anisman identifies instances where the objectives of
36 ANISMAN, supra note 1,at 333-38.

37 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
38 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
39SEC Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1975); SEC Schedule 14D, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14d-101 (1975). See, e.g., ANISMAN, supra note 1, at iv-viii. In an updating from
April, 1972, to December, 1973, Anisman cites only one of the significant cases that
require broader disclosure than specified in the itemized schedules: Corenco Corp. v.
Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 488 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1973)
(cash offeror required to reveal substantially more about itself than itemized schedules

specify).
40 See Lewis, supra note 7, at 1, col. 3.
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disclosure are (1) to discourage behavior that is, if not illegal, at
best unappetizing to those who learn about it; 4 ' (2) to uncover
illegal conduct, either consummated or potential, so that countermeasures can be activated; 42 and (3) to explain legal rights
and options. 43 SEC Commissioner A. A. Sommer, Jr., has propounded the "damper" theory of disclosure. The gist of this
concept is that once a truthful disclosure is made, it serves as a
standard of comparison for all other communications by anyone
on the same subject. Thus, defective disclosure will be deterred
statements might
because furnishers of information know their
44
be tested against the authentic publication.
III. "SUBSTANTIVE" REGULATION: ANCILLARY TO
INFORMATIONAL RULES OR TRULY NON-INFORMATIONAL?
The foregoing discussion deals mainly with disclosure theory
in the tender offer context. Certainly, however, the tender offer
laws substantially limit the private bargaining of the participants,
particularly the offeror. Why does the law so invade and readjust
private arrangements and the exercise of corporate power? It
may be suggested that such a healthy dose of regulation was
possible, especially at the federal level, only with the sponsorship
and lobbying efforts of the issuers who were the natural quarry
of takeover bidders. But beyond this "special interest" explanation, we look for a more satisfying rationale. Simple invocations
of fairness seem inadequate.
Some "substantive" rules, of course, are meant primarily to
facilitate the disclosure process. Anisman notes that minimum
offer periods, minimum offeree withdrawal periods, and minimum periods before offeror take-up (in partial offers) are all in
some degree designed to afford offerees sufficient time to reflect
upon information. 5
Once adequate disclosure and sufficient time to digest it
have been assured, however, why is further regulatory intermeddling called for? First, we may be convinced that the average
offeree, despite efforts to inform him, will not foresee or fully
understand all the consequences of the contract formed when he
deposits his shares. Second, we may fear that the tender contract, though lawful when made, creates an opportunity or a
supra note 1, at 160, 163.
1d. 155.
43
Id. 148-49.
44Sommer, Required Disclosure in the Stock Market: The Other Side, SEC News Release,
Sept. 27, 1973.
45 ANISMAN, supra note 1, at 67-74.
41 ANISMAN,
42
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strong temptation to perform wrongful acts, and that the danger
of such undesirable behavior is great. Third, we may believe that
a special relationship of trust and confidence arises which implies not only a duty to disclose, 46 but also an undertaking by the
person in whom the trust is reposed to act in the best interests of
the one reposing it. For any of these reasons, controls over bargaining may be justified, and we may find the law modifying the
characteristics of private arrangements.
Tender offer laws may provide, for instance, that an increase in the offer price must be paid to all whose securities are
taken up, whether deposited before or after the increase. Such a
provision seems fair because the pre-increase depositors irrevocably commit their securities (assuming the expiration of withdrawal periods) to the control of the offeror for the duration of
the offer, while the offeror may not be bound to buy.4 7 On the
other hand, do not the pre-increase depositors accept, in exchange for the possibility of a premium price, the risk that other
offerees might receive a higher price? Fairness, then, does not
seem to be an adequate rationale. An unduly suspicious soul
could conjecture that this provision is just another hurdle
created by those who wish generally to hobble tender offers.
More satisfying rationales for price equalization do exist.
First, despite full and clear disclosure, the average offeree may
not fully understand the opportunities lost by depositing his
shares at the initial offering price, if by that act he also foregoes
the chance to withdraw or receive a higher price when the offeror later raises the bid. Second, by accepting irrevocable preincrease deposits, which need not be taken up until the offer
becomes unconditional, the offeror may be voluntarily accepting
the depositors' trust. The offer to take control of the offeree
issuer might itself be viewed as creating a fiduciary posture for
the offeror.4 8 Because an implication of fiduciary status is the
duty not to show partiality among the beneficiaries, this analysis
could explain the price equalization requirement.
Anisman considers another form of mandatory allocation of
risk between contracting parties when he discusses prohibitions
against conditions on the offeror's obligation to take up.49 He
rejects strictures on the offeror's freedom to tailor his commitments, suggesting that the risks would be tilted unfairly against

6

4 See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
41 ANISMAN, supra note 1, at 90-91.

" See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
49 ANISMAN,

supra note 1, at 82-87.
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the offeror.5 0 Anisman recognizes here and throughout the book
that many statutory constraints on the offeror-offeree contract
also constitute strategic advantages for the offeree issuer's management, whose motives for staving off the bid may not coincide
with the economic well-being of the offerees or anyone else affected by the operations of the offeree issuer. We therefore must
scrutinize such constraints intensely and insist upon rigorous policy rationales.
Even in a price system of economics that recognizes consumer sovereignty, it could be argued that government intervention is appropriate to prevent persons from making economically
irrational choices with respect to financial capital assets, especially where the social effects of such decisions disrupt other
price system functions. It would appear, however, that the application of such a principle should be preceded by a very careful
theoretical examination of the tender offer bargaining process.
If it can be demonstrated that fully informed offerees would
enter into economically inexplicable contractual relations regarding their securities, either in ignorance or out of perversity, an economic rationale may support overriding the private
agreement.
Mr. Anisman's careful survey shows that Canadian statutes
contain a number of substantive provisions not found in the
Williams Act, most notably: a minimum offer period, 5 1 a maximum term for partial offers 5 2 a minimum period before the
offeror may take up in a partial offer 5 3 a pro rata take-up requirement with respect to all deposits in a partial offer, 54 and a
general "variation" provision that more readily triggers a new
offeree withdrawal period. 55 State laws in Colorado, Hawaii,
Idaho, Indiana, Minnesota, Nevada, Ohio, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin track the Canadian patterns. On other matters, our federal regulation is more stringent than Canada's. For
example, the Williams Act provides a withdrawal right after any
5 6
offer, including one for all shares, has been open for 60 days
and SEC rule 10b-4 forbids short tendering. 5 7 Anisman urges
Canadian adoption of these two measures. 58 Canada has no cog50

Id. 84-85.

51 Id. 68.
52
53
54

55

Id. 77.
1d. 71.
1d.

Id. 87.

56 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1970).

57 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-4 (1975).
58 ANISMAN, supra note 1, at 80, 99.
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nate of our SEC rule 10b-13, 59 which prohibits purchases by the
offeror "alongside the bid," in market or privately negotiated
transactions. Anisman disagrees with both countries' solutions to
this problem. He thoroughly canvasses the concerns that underlie rule lOb-13. A major consideration is that the offeror might
make extra-bid purchases to interfere with terms of his own
offer, 60 for instance, to prevent fulfillment of the minimum
share condition on his take-up obligation. Here certain private
bargaining is circumscribed because it poses too great a threat of
future unlawful behavior. Anisman quite appropriately seeks the
least restrictive way of controlling this danger, namely, requiring
that securities acquired outside the bid be counted toward the
61
minimum deposit condition on the offeror's promise to buy.
He also proposes timely disclosure, price equalization, and prorating provisions to govern outside purchases. 62 In all,
Anisman's treatment of this topic is one of the book's genuinely
creative insights.
The section of the book on offer "variations" highlights the
need for a thorough understanding of the contractual nature of
tender offers.6 3 After more than a decade (counting the early
laws in New Zealand and Australia), we still may not have a firm
grasp of the precise promissory and conditional content of the
relationship. Anisman, who is a skillful massager of statutory
detail, pinpoints a series of interpretative puzzles that involve
both standard contract analysis and the conflict of contractual
notions with apparent legislative intent. 64 He gives us enough
examples to substantiate the conclusion that legislative drafters
do not reflect upon the basic contractual structure of the typical
bid. What occurs when an offeree deposits his securities? The
consensus is that the offeror is to some extent conditionally
bound in contract; but what are his promises and what are the
conditions on those promises? One of the major undertakings is
to take up securities under the original terms of the offer, if the
minimum deposit condition is met. Therefore, the offeror appears obligated, absent other permissible express arrangements,
to leave the offer open upon its original terms (so that the
minimum deposit condition can be fulfilled) and to take up securities on the terms prevailing at the time of deposit, including
!9 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1975).
60 ANISMAN, supra note 1, at 101.
61
1d. 106.
62
Id. 105-06.
63
Id. 87-96.
64
Id. 87-90.
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provisions for payment. Thus, those who deposit in response to
the original offer could presumably object to attempts of the
offeror to vary his promises as to them, say, by converting from
a total class offer to a partial one (with the possible statutory
effect of prorating) or by extending the offer period and not
paying depositors according to the original time schedule.
Moreover, an obligation may exist not to vary terms as to those
who have not yet deposited, unless such a prerogative is plainly
reserved, since it can be argued that depositors bargain for continued uniformity of the offer.
Even at this point the complexity wrought by the statutory
overlay is obvious. Conversion from a total to a partial offer
seems impermissible. The tender offer statutes require prorating
in the case of overdeposit in a partial offer. On the other hand,
those who deposit while an offer is for a total class reasonably
believe that all of their securities must be taken up. Such a conflict should militate against conversion. Behold! A Canadian
provision specifically states the consequences of conversion. Does
the provision, Anisman asks, imply that the normal contract response (that conversion is wrongful because it anticipates a failure of performance) is overruled? Or does the provision specifying the effects of conversion speak only to the case in which a
conversion right is reserved by the offeror? The same questions
can be asked about the Canadian statutes that grant an additional period of withdrawal rights to those who deposit before
any variation. Suppose an offeror, though not expressly entitled
to do so, extends the term of his offer and delays payment to
those who deposited before the extension. In bestowing upon
the depositor a new right to withdraw when a variation occurs,
did the legislature intend also to invest the offeror with a right of
modification not otherwise available? Is the right of withdrawal
in lieu of all the contractual remedies of the depositor?
Much remains to be done in working out the fundamental
contractual framework of tender offers, particularly in view of
the many points of interaction between statutes and traditional
contract theory. Until a plenary exegesis is undertaken, we can
thank authors like Anisman 65 for their spadework and exhort
legislators and agencies to be more thorough and precise in their
consideration of fundamental contract issues.
Anisman is reform-minded and sensitive to the need to
offer justifications for the many revisions of Canadian law he
65

See, e.g., E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR
n.18 (1973); Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 20, at 350-53.

CORPORATE CONTROL

69
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proffers. This reviewer would prefer, however, to see the more
traditional, sometimes venerable policy themes probed more
deeply, systematically, and comprehensively, especially in light of
related disciplines. To state this personal predilection is not to
detract from the total quality of Anisman's presentation. Indeed,
a more perceptive reader may find that Anisman has, by enthymeme, fathomed policy far more critically than this reviewer
realizes.
IV.

COMPARISONS

Anisman's animus is to be a comparativist. He is most intensely so when discussing provincial and dominion laws, which
are the main topic of his text and the operation of which he
scrutinizes to a fare-thee-well. The text, however, constitutes no
more than one third the total page space; below the line the
author cites and textually explains the approaches of other countries. Assiduous perusal of the footnotes is well worth the eyestrain; they are a wonderland of thought-provoking juxtapositions.
A. Pure Self-Regulation: England's City Code
Anisman's comparisons include extensive references to
England's City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (City Code),
which is a purely self-regulatory ethic of the English financial
community administered by the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (Panel). 66 Sanctions exist, if at all, only to the extent that
other self-regulatory bodies (for example, stock exchanges and
investment banking associations) and the government Department of Trade and Industry (which administers broker-dealer
licensing) are willing to heed the recommendations of the
Panel.67 Anisman intimates that, from their inception in 1968,
the City Code and the Panel have become increasingly effective
and respected. 6 8 Then he cryptically notes that self-regulation
failed in Canada.6 9 One might have expected the contrast to
spark further discussion. Anisman's view of the City Code is not
shared in all quarters. ° Paradoxically, his many references show
66 ANISMAN, supra note 1, at 2 n.8. For an explanation of the role of the City Code, as
contrasted with pertinent English statutes, see G. COOPER & R. CRIDLAN, LAW AND
PROCEDURE OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE 90-98 (1971); R. PENNINGTON, COMPANY LAW
786-98 (1973).
67 ANISMAN, supra note 1, at 1-2 & n.6, 3-4 n.13.
68
Id. 3-4 n.13.
69 Id. 4.
70 See, e.g., Davies, An Affair of the City: A Case Study in the Regulation of Take-Overs and
Mergers, 36 MOD. L. REV. 457 (1973).
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the City Code to be substantively strong, while other sources
suggest the Panel has some infirmities-perhaps71the absence of
power and resources or simple lack of fortitude.
B. Federalism
Anyone who reads this book, footnotes and all, must derive
valuable insights about the different types of federalism in
Canada and the United States. The division of governmental
power in Canada may mandate tender offer legislation at the
provincial level. Considerable doubt exists whether Parliament
has the broad interstate commerce powers possessed by
Congress, 72 and so the dominion tender offer laws relate only to
federally chartered corporations. Thus, provincial regulation is
the only means to control tender offers for the securities
of non-federal corporations. This relationship explains Anisman's apparent indifference to arguments for preemption in this
country.
Canadian laws resemble our state legislation in some respects, but they do not display the clearly lopsided favoritism
that one finds, for example, in the Ohio law. There the offeree
issuer's management is given an opportunity to delay the offer
and to activate a relatively lengthy hearing on the issue whether
the offeror is providing full and fair disclosure to offerees. 7 3 In
this country, we need not endure absurdly unbalanced specialinterest legislation at the state level: There is ample federal
power to restore the equilibrium, and this reviewer, for one,
hopes that the yoke will soon be lifted. A Federal Securities Code
provision, which Anisman's book antedates, would preempt all
the state tender offer laws as they apply to bids for the securities
of specified issuers-basically those who now file periodic reports
74
under the Securities Exchange Act.
Anisman generally favors a pre-bid filing and review requirement that would permit administrative agencies to measure
the tender offeror's compliance with disclosure obligations, to
detect defective information, and perhaps even to pass upon the
merits of the offer. 75 In Canada no pre-offer filing and review
exist even with respect to exchange offer materials. In this coun7

1Id. 474-78.

72 ANISMAN, supra note 1, at 316 n.83; J.P. WILLIAMSON, SECURITIES REGULATION IN

CANADA 189-95 (1960).
" OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(B)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1974).
71 ALl FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 160 3 (c)(1) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1974).
75 ANISMAN, supra note 1, at 208-19.
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try the Williams Act contains no such feature.7 6 Anisman's proposals might, as he argues, furnish an element'of prophylaxis
and also strengthen enforcement. He would, however, limit prebid disclosure to administrative agencies on a confidential basis,
and he presumably would not give the offeree issuer's management the right to institute a front-end hearing on the issue of
disclosure.
C. When is a Takeover Bid in Progress?
Where should we place the boundary markers in the game
of takeover bidding? What is the "essence" of takeover bid? Both
functional and structural approaches are possible. Structuralism
reduces doubt at the perimeter, but the functionalist becomes
uneasy about situations in which the rigidities of formal tests do
not jibe with policy objectives.
The structuralist depends on mechanical criteria to solve the
larger problems of applicability. He would determine whether or
not a takeover bid is in progress by reference to the conceptual
content of old standby words of art like "offer to purchase"
("tender offer" in this country), and by giving nearly dispositive
effect to the presence or absence of standard formalities-salient
features distilled from the type of arrangement that drew the
greatest attention in legislative deliberations. Such a stereotyped
structure would specify characteristics like (1) public dissemination of a formal bid, (2) solicitation outside the organized trading
market, (3) the absence of individual negotiations, and (4) the
use of standardized terms. The functionalist entertains a more
fluid view; he asks whether the facts and circumstances of varying transactions give rise to relevant policy concerns. Of course,
he pays a price in terms of energies expended on ad hoc investigations.
The two theories are employed and challenged in various
ways. At the statutory design stage, it is necessary to decide what
use shall be made of exemptions and definitional exclusions. If
the application of formal criteria will produce overcoverage so
inconsistent with policy that it cannot be justified in the name of
interpretative convenience or predictability, how do we cut back?
Do we carve out equally formalistic exceptions? Consider a bid
that clearly fits the mechanical description of what is understood
76 Filing of required documents with the Commission must be prior in time to the
making of the bid, but no minimum period is specified. Securities Exchange Act of 1934

§ 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1970).
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"inthe trade" as a takeover bid-that is, the culprit that most
legislatures were quite consciously pursuing. Suppose, however,
it is suggested that the offer is not made for the purpose of
giving the offeror control? In some instances the offeror may be
no more than a passive investor. Most takeover statutes handle
this problem by threshold exclusions or exemptions expressed in
terms of a minimum percentage of equity securities to be held
after a successful completion of the offer. Only at the level of the
stated percentage, and above, is there a presumption of power to
control. It is further assumed that such power will be exercised.
(The structuralist is seeking the comforts of objectivity.) Anisman
argues that policy considerations (particularly, one assumes, the
"anticipatory" duties owed by one who seeks a fiduciary position)
require more flexibility below the minimum. He proposes the
use of an objective percentage (above which control is presumed)
plus coverage for any smaller bid that would "materially affect
control. '7 7 (Here is the functionalist asking for interpretative
trouble.)
Still in the legislative design stage, the structuralist may try
to excise unwanted applicability by expressly paring away certain forms of purchasing, such as "market purchases" or "private
negotiations," from statutory coverage. Unlike our federal law,
the Canadian codes exempt these two types of transactions from
takeover-bid regulation. 78 These exemptions follow the pattern
of placing regulatory emphasis on the type of transaction that
was uppermost in the minds of legislators.
Lopping of this sort may be dangerously indiscriminate,
however, because, as mentioned briefly earlier, market and
negotiated transactions are not necessarily free of circumstances
7 9
that justify the imposition of special disclosure requirements.
Though market purchases do not create pressure of the same
intensity as that generated by the announcement of a formal bid,
unusual buying activity can cause the market price to move to a
new level, which may tempt holders to sell and non-holders to
buy. Besides, if the takeover aspirant is already in the process of
accumulating control as he makes his market purchases, the anticipatory fiduciary duty to disclose may be activated, especially0
8
as regards a market seller who keeps some of his securities.
These observations are especially pertinent when private negotiANISMAN, supra note 1, at 21-34.
Id.37-44, 51-58.
" See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
80 See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
17

78
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ations and market purchases are followed immediately by a formal takeover bid that is indisputably subject to regulation. Integrated, such a chain of events is sometimes aptly described as a
"creeping" takeover.
We are bothered by these problems in this country, where
there are no statutory dispensations. Can private negotiations or
market purchases be the headwaters or "tag-beginnings" of a bid
in a sense substantial enough to draw them under the regulatory
umbrella? The accumulation reports provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act 8 ' have tended to discourage integration of pre-bid
acquisitions with a subsequent formal offer, although it is not
clear that this is the wisest approach. s
Though he strives mightily to weave a statute starched with
certainty, the structuralist is inevitably abandoned when his formalism begins to fray at the edges. Even if a public bid possesses
most of the features of the classic takeover bid with which the
solons have been most clearly concerned, the bidder may still
have some latitude to finesse regulation by surgically planning
around certain statutory language which carries a heavy traditional content. Anisman gives a good example of this mutiny of
mechanics. The Canadian legislation speaks of a takeover bid in
terms of "an offer to purchase." Suppose the "offeror" just
chaffers-saying, in effect, to shareholders of the acquired issuer: "Make me an offer to sell." In Canada, this pattern may
not be subject to regulation, even if the invitation has most of the
other stereotyped trappings that situate it well within the boundaries of the takeover bid concept.8 3 Some may argue that we
have avoided the problem in the United States by expanding our
phraseology to include "requests or invitations for tenders." But
quaere: If the "offeror" solicits offers to sell without an immediate
deposit requirement, has he made a request for tenders?
In addition, even the structuralist has to deal with the "gunjumping" question. If an offeror announces in a press release
that he will later make a formal public offer, and if the release
details the likely terms of the offer and gives other data about
the offeror or offeree issuer, does the press release create a need
for regulatory compliance? It may not be an offer to buy in the
strict contract law sense, but may we not read an "attempt to
acquire" notion into the tender offer laws? A plausible argument
based on statutory construction could be proffered against such
81 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970).
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11003 (Sept. 9, 1974), (topic B-2).
83 ANISMAN, supra note 1, at 58-59.

82 See
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a result: The legislatures knew how to state a broad concept of
offer from their experience with distributional regulation. But if
we are serious about the undesirable effects of unregulated
psychological preconditioning, why should our solicitude slacken
with respect to takeover bids?
D. Disseminationof Information to Offerees
In sharp contrast with the American approach is the Canadian requirement that bid circulars be sent by offerors to each
offeree. 84 Management of the offeree issuer must make a similar distribution if it recommends acceptance or rejection of the
offer.8 5 Neither the Williams Act nor our state statutes requires
delivery of disclosure materials to all offerees. But if we seriously
believe that disclosure is directly assimilable by average investors,
perhaps we should require dissemination to individual offerees.
The SEC probably has the power to require such dissemination
under its authorization to promulgate rules designed to prevent
deceptive practices 8 6 or to regulate recommendations regarding
87
rejection or acceptance.
E. Compulsory Response by the Offeree Issuer
Anisman wants to force management of the offeree issuer to
respond to the offer, whether it wants to or not.8 8 In addition to
furnishing certain factual material, management would be required to make a recommendation or say why it has no
position.8 9 Again, the SEC probably has the authority to draw
the offeree issuer's management out of silence.
Existing American federal law, it may be argued, already
goes part of the distance toward Anisman's objective. An issuer
may have a duty to correct erroneous statements made about it
by others" ° and to make regular disclosure of any internal development that is "ripe" (that is, accurately known in terms of its
dimensions and impact on the issuer) unless an adequate business reason exists for not publishing it.9 1 Moreover, if insiders or
84

1d. 61-66.
85 Id. 243-44.
86Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
81 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(d)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (1970).
88ANISMAN, supra note 1, at 247-53. For a similar view, see Note, A Proposalfor
Affirmative Disclosure ly Target Management During Tender Offers, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 190

(1975).
89 ANISMAN, supra note 1, at 272-73.

"0 E.g., Green v. Jonhop, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ore. 1973).
91 Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
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persons in possession of inside information accept the offer, they
would have a duty to disclose to the offeror. To avoid a tipping
charge, they would also have to publicize whatever they reveal.
None of these antifraud obligations would appear to extract as
much information as Anisman believes ought to be forthcoming
from the offeree issuer's management. He would demand,
under certain circumstances, financial statements, current asset
values, corrections of offeror statements, projections of earnings,
management intentions,92 and ultimately the attitude of management toward the offer.

The pros and cons of such regulation should be weighed
carefully. Anisman begins with the proposition that management
knows the issuer best, and he intimates that management has a
duty to inform its shareholders as soon as someone seeks to
purchase their securities. But management may legitimately wish
to avoid exposure to antifraud liability, especially for the projections and estimates 93 which Anisman would require. Management may also justifiably fear exposure to claims that it has improperly used enterprise assets to perpetuate its ascendancy,
especially where, if compelled to speak, it would recommend
against the offer. 94 Anisman would seek to allay fears of
shareholders' suits against offeree directors for misuse of corporate assets by providing a statutory allowance of costs incurred in
the preparation of management's circular. A "reasonableness"
limitation, however, would have to be imposed on expenses to
prevent this device from being exploited as a free tool for fending off the bidder. 95 Thus, management might still tend toward
silence rather than face possible litigation on the issue of
"reasonableness." Finally, a forced response might elicit premature disclosure of plans and developments that are the product
of management's inventiveness. Even if, assuming the primacy of
fiduciary duties, management of the offeree issuer has no right
generally to keep its designs and projects private in the hope of
earning later shareholder approbation, enterprise values might
be lost by premature disclosure of proprietary matters.
F. Exchange Offers

Exchange offers are handled quite differently under Canadian and American systems. Our statutes governing primary dis92 ANISMAN, supra
93
Id.269-72.
94

Id. 258.
9-Id. 258-61.

note 1, at 261-73.
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tributions are, generally speaking, simply superimposed on the
tender offer. For the most part, therefore, the Securities Act of
193396 and the Blue Sky laws are applied as usual, including
filing and agency review and the imposition of the Blue Sky
administrator's judgment as to fairness. The "fairness hearing"
statutes of some states, which Anisman fails to discuss, enable an
offeror to initiate a proceeding in which the Blue Sky administrator is asked to find that the terms of an exchange offer are
fair.97 Upon the entry of a fairness order, the offeror may be
entitled to an exemption from the Securities Act of 1933 as well
as from the registration requirement of the Blue Sky laws under
which the hearing was held. 9 8 This scheme makes it possible for
offerees in an exchange bid to be deprived of substantial information about the offeror that would have otherwise been provided under the Securities Act and the normally operative state
securities provisions.
Canadian statutes, on the other hand, begin by exempting a
takeover bid from the normal securities offering process and
then require that the exchange offer include prospectus-type
information.9 9 This approach shortcuts the filing, review, and
substantive judgment phases of ordinary securities registration.
As already observed, Anisman contends that pre-offer filing and
review, on a confidential basis, would be beneficial. Anisman
would also opt to have both exchange offers and cash offers
subject to the substantive fairness standards currently applied by
provincial administrators to other types of distributions. 0 0 While
fairness concepts might at first seem alien to the takeover bid
context, one can envisage an exchange offer which involves the
basic Blue Sky problems of dilution, non-voting stock, and cashflow sufficiency (where fixed payment senior securities are
issued). 1 1
G. InformationalLacunae
Those who advocate maximum disclosure can find gaps in
tender offer laws on both sides of the border. The Williams Act
arguably fails, in exchange offers and even in cash offers, to
educe from the offeror enough information about the offeree
96

15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970).

97 E.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §

1707.04 (Page 1964).

98 Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(I0) (1970); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN.

§ 1"707.04 (Page 1964).
99 ANISMAN, supra note 1, at 180-85.
00

101 Id.

214-15.
1d. 215 n.347.
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issuer, particularly where the facts fall beyond the sphere of
plans, intentions, and business analysis. Even where the offeror
has gathered little known "outside" facts not generated from
within the offeree issuer, the case for requiring disclosure is
strong, on several grounds. The standard "pressure" and "offeree disadvantage" arguments 10 2 may be advanced. Furthermore, the goal of protecting offeror creativity, where information is other than the original plans, intentions, and analysis of
the offeror, seems less exigent than in other contexts. If the
offeror has already garnered the data, the further cost of dissemination may be small. (It is, of course, not urged that the
offeror has a duty to collect the data.) Add to this the fiduciary
aura that arguably pervades the offeror-offeree relationship,
and the scales tip more decisively. In this country, these lacunae
may well be filled by agency
rules 10 3 and judicial interpretations
04
of antifraud doctrines.'
Anisman also criticizes Canadian law for not adequately
eliciting pro forma financial data about the offeror in an exchange offer.' 0 5 This problem is created in part by the peculiar
way in which Canada's statutes first exempt offers from regular
registration and prospectus requirements and then demand
specific prospectus-like disclosures.10 6 The practice in this country is much more satisfactory as our state and
federal securities
07
registration provisions continue to function.1
H. Offeror Identification and Treatment of ForeignInvestors
Blind cash offers, offers by unidentified offerors, are allowed in Canada but not in the United States. Nonetheless, we
may still be in the dark about who the real takeover bidders are.
Devising methods of unveiling the puppeteers is a current item
on the agendas of the SEC 10 8 and the Treasury Department. 0 9
102

See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.

103The Commission has the power to expand disclosure under Securities Exchange

Act of 1934 §§ 13(d)(1) & 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(1), 78n(d)(1) (1970).
104 E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970). See text
accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
105ANISMAN, supra note 1, at 197-203.
106 See text accompanying note 99 supra.
107 See text accompanying note 96 supra.
108 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11616 (Aug. 25, 1975); id. No. 11003
(Sept. 9, 1974) (topics A-1 to A-4).
109 The Treasury Department has been given authority to study the effects of
foreign portfolio investment in United States issuers. See Foreign Investment Study Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-479, 88 Stat. 1450. It has exercised that authority. See 39 Fed.
Reg. 44,119 (1974). See also Exec. Order No. 11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (1975).
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The goals of these efforts seem to extend beyond concern for
offerees to larger national interests, such as shielding key industries from foreign control and combating the exercise of corporate power as an instrument of ethnic discrimination. 110 Worthy
as these goals may otherwise seem, creating roadblocks for tender offerors reduces the vulnerability of reigning managers-an
effect not always in the best interests of shareholders or the
nation. The questions to be asked are: Can national objectives be
attained without tinkering with the tender offer laws? And, if
changes must be made, can we use a scalpel instead of an ax?
Surely we should avoid creating a statutory defense technique
that potential offeree issuers can routinely invoke even when no
real likelihood of unwanted social and economic behavior exists.
I. Sanctions: Deterrence and Compensation
Anisman's chapter on liabilities exposes the striking dissimilarities between limited Canadian sanctions and the broad
patterns of relief under American federal law. Only a sea change
could eliminate the differences. Anisman is convinced that
Canadian criminal penalties do not deter, primarily because no
agency formally reviews the takeover bid process and consequently the likelihood of official detection of violations is
remote."' The book makes no mention of civil enforcement by
Canadian administrative agencies (injunctive actions or disciplinary proceedings), but it does include a fine description of the
halting development of common law notions of negligent misrepresentation and implied private rights in the English and
Canadian courts." 2 It is interesting to observe a Canadian
lawyer's reaction to the vibrant judicial trends in the area of
implied private rights for violations of rule lOb-5 and the Williams Act. Though he slights some of the refinements, Anisman
captures the basic ideology of our great experiment in supplemental enforcement and statutory tort. He admires the way the
United States federal courts mold the implied private right to
110 Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., has introduced a bill that would, inter alia,
require the filing of pre-acquisition statements by foreign investors who would, after the
intended acquisition, own more than five per cent of the equity securities of certain
United States issuers. The President could prohibit an acquisition on grounds related to
national security, foreign policy, or the domestic economy. S. 425, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
§ 2(b) (1975). An amendment to forbid investment by those who engage in business
boycotts has been offered. 121 CONG. REC. 2892 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1975) (remarks of
Senator Williams). See also Hearings on S. 425 before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
' ANISMAN, supra note 1, at 213, 306-07; see id. 303-06.
2
11 Id. 308-18.
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grant varying forms of relief to different interest 'groups seeking
to redress a wide range of undesirable behavior. 113 Though
Anisman enthusiastically embraces the judicial flexibility of the
American approach, a different prescription could be written for
a country in a position to try an alternative. Our experiences
with implied right doctrines have not been free from headaches.
Severe strains on rule lOb-5 were created by the claims of nonpurchasing and nonselling participants in tender offer battles.- 14
While section 14(e) relegates this problem to history, the debate
shifts to more fundamental notions of standing. (Anisman understandably passes over the mechanistic aspects of the purchaser-seller controversy; even the common law of deceit may
give standing to one who refrains from action." 5) The courts
of appeals are also still grappling with issues such as scienter,-1
and we continue the Procrustean struggle to fit fundamentally
different forms of conduct into a general antifraud framework. 1 17 Fashioning relief after an acquisition is frequently a
complex task." l8 Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Co., 1 9 demonstrates
the need for rationalizing the deterrent and compensatory features of implied private civil actions. Instead of codifying a
blank-check authorization of the courts to promote good and
deter evil in takeover bids, a jurisdiction could first try a vigorous program of governmental surveillance and enforcement-including intensive criminal prosecutions, stiff fines, and extensive use of agency civil enforcement mechanisms to obtain
prompt injunctions and remedial ancillary relief. In the long
run, the costs of deterrence and compensation might be lower
113

1d. 333-38.
114Compare Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970), with Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co.,
419 F.2d 787, 797-99 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970). The Supreme
Court has given considerable new weight to the so-called purchaser-seller limitation on
rule lOb-5 in another context in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 95 S. Ct. 1917
(1975).
1" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).

116Compare Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973), with White v.
Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
117 When an offeree issuer induces its shareholders to avoid the offeror's bid, something basically different from the standard fraud pattern is presented. In 1970, this
reviewer analyzed the situation as tortious interference with economic relationships. Coffey, Post Acquisition Relief, 3 REV. OF SEC. REG. 907, 910 (1970). This theory was later

espoused by the Second Circuit in Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480
F.2d 341, 360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
11' See, e.g., Coffey, supra note 117.
119 95 S. Ct. 2069 (1975) (showing of irreparable harm necessary for a private party
to receive injunctive relief under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(d) (1970)).
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than when private parties engage in protracted litigation over
difficult issues of liability and relief. Moreover, if government
enforcement were swift and sure, potential violators might not
gamble against being brought to task, as they probably do when
their principal exposure is to private suit.
J. CorporationLaw
Anisman's work also contrasts a number of British-Canadian
and American corporate law concepts pertinent to the takeover
bid process. Anisman is no pasticheur, however; he has a sharp
sense of relevance and organization and does a good job of
selecting locations for his excursions into corporate law. In his
mini-treatise footnotes throughout the book, and in his text on
defense tactics, the author covers: (1) inspection rights; 120 (2)
sale of control; 1 21 (3) bootstrap bids-offers financed out of the
assets of the offeree issuer; 22 (4) compulsory buy-up--the statutory process through which an offeror can force a non-depositing minority to accept the tender offer when the percentage of voluntary deposits has been very high; 1 23 (5) special
arrangements with managers of the offeree issuer; 24 and (6)
limitations on the perpetuation of management by exercise of
12 5
corporate power.
Within the last category is the question of repurchases of
securities by the offeree issuer. Repurchases are a familiar defense tactic. Anisman, like others, 26 criticizes the way courts
have allowed directors to defend their personal power under the
guise of policy conflicts. 1 27 He suggests that shareholder approval should be required for all repurchases after a bid has
begun. 1 28 Under the Williams Act, SEC rule 13e-11 29 requires
only a modicum of disclosure by management in connection with
a repurchase during a tender offer.
This reviewer believes that under Securities Exchange Act
sections 13(e) 130 and 14(e)' 3 1 the SEC can by rule expand the
120 ANISMAN,

supra note 1, at 61-63.

121 Id. 37-40 n.65.
22
1 Id. 9-11 n.3.
2
1 31d. 77-78 & nn.90-91.
24
1 1Id. 155 & n.55.
125

Id. 288-96.

126 See Cary, Federalismand CorporateLaw: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663,

673-75 (1974).

supra note 1, 292.
1 Id. 296.
129 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-1 (1975).
120 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1970).
7
131 15 U.S.C. § 8n(e) (1970).
127 ANISMAN,
28
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disclosure requirements to the dimensions of a prospectus regarding the repurchasing issuer and forbid the repurchase unless certain conditions are fulfilled. A valid business purpose
might even be required. A valid "business purpose" would be
defined to exclude fighting to save one's skin, which could always be framed as defending some general business policy. The
Commission might even make shareholder approval a condition.
If the SEC has acted within bounds in its promulgation of other
heavily substantive preventive rules pursuant to general antifraud
statutes, the preceding proposals seem valid. Relying on section
14(e) alone, the Commission could also regulate3 2sales of securities by the offeree issuer during takeover bids.1
As noted earlier, Anisman gives no separate treatment to
the behavior pattern known as "going private." The objective of
the process is to terminate public holdings in the issuer and
concomitant responsibilities. The popularity of the practice
postdates Anisman's publication. Although the mechanics often
include an issuer's tender offer for its own shares, the technique
might not be considered a takeover bid. On the other hand,
going private may involve the acquisition or consolidation of
proprietary control by an issuer's own management shareholders. Even where none of the issuer's officers and directors
are shareholders, the act of going private may reduce management's vulnerability to a takeover from outside. Moreover,
non-shareholder management has a fiduciary duty not to show
partiality among shareholders without a good business reason.
Going private often results in the shrinkage or destruction of the
market for shares still outstanding after the issuer makes its repurchases. Therefore, those who sell their shares back to the
issuer may benefit from management's exercise of corporate
power at the expense of remaining shareholders. Thus, without
embellishing the fact pattern, to fulfill its fiduciary responsibilities, management arguably must have a valid business purpose for a going-private repurchase. Again, sections 13(e) and
14(e) would support the SEC's adoption of disclosure and sub33
stantive rules.1
The SEC, under its prophylactic rulemaking power, can
supplement or overshadow state law limitations on the exercise
of corporate power, even though no deceptive element is clearly
in the forefront of the transactional context.
Cf. ANISMAN, supra note 1, at 292-93.
"' The Commission apparently shares this view. See SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 11231 (Feb. 6, 1975) (Proposed Rule 13e-3A(c)(2), 13e-3B(a)(1)-(2) and
Additional Inquiry F).
I32
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CONCLUSION

Anisman's writing is crisp, compact, and sometimes disconcertingly terse. He moves quickly in the text; elaboration is
found in the footnotes, where he does most of his comparative
work. Many references to actual offers add realism to the
author's intricate analysis of regulatory specifics.
The organizational schema is excellent. Material is arranged
to facilitate a sequential development of concepts and rationales.
The reader should realize, however, that Anisman is more of a
Beethoven than a Chopin in the integration of his discussion.
The content of each analytical segment is not tightly compartmentalized or self-contained. The reader is expected to remember what happened pages ago. This characteristic may reduce the book's value as a quick-reference treatise.
Mr. Anisman's goal was not to create a treatise in the strictly
traditional sense. He wants us to take a look at others so that we
can look at ourselves differently. Anyone who carefully reads
this book will rethink takeover bids from the ground up. We can
thank Anisman for his leading thoughts.

